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YOLO SUPERIOR COURT

APR 3 0 2010

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF YOLO

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Dept.

Case No. 08-3355

13

Plaintiff,

Defendant(s)

DATE:

May 21, 2010

PEOPLE'S OPPOSITION TO

vs.

TIME:

8:30 AM

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE

DEPT:

MARCO ANTONIO TOPETE,

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The People submit the following opposition to the defendant's motion for change of venue:

I.

THERE IS NO LEGITIMATE BASIS FOR A CHANGE OF VENUE IN THIS CASE

A trial court must grant a change of venue if "there is a reasonable likelihood that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county" in which the charges were brought. California Penal Code § 1033, subd. (a); see Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966) 384

U.S. 333, 362; People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 672, overruled on other grounds in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823; Maine v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 375. Among the factors the trial court considers in ruling on a motion for change of venue are "the nature and gravity of the offense, the size of the community, the status of the defendant, the popularity and prominence of the victim, and of course the nature and extent of the publicity." People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 578; see also People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398,434.

The ultimate question for the trial court is "whether on the peculiar facts of the individual case [citation] there is a reasonable likelihood that the jurors who will be, or have been, chosen for the defendant's trial have formed such fixed opinions as a result of pretrial publicity that they cannot make the determinations required of them with impartiality." People v. Bonin, supra, at pp. 672-673. Defendant, as the moving party, bears the burden of proof. Id. at p. 673. "A denial of a motion for change of venue will be upheld on appeal unless the record shows both that it was ' "reasonably likely [that] a fair trial could not be had at the time the motion was made," ' and that it was ' "reasonably likely a fair trial was not in fact had." ' " People v. Massie, supra, at p. 578. "Reasonably likely" in this context means something less than " ' "more probable than not," ' " but something more than "merely possible." People v. Williams (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1112, 1126; see People v. Bonin, supra, at p. 673.

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In reality, the actual venue of a cop-killer trial matters little when solely considering a prospective juror's expected reaction to such a case. As the California Supreme Court has explained: "Communities undoubtedly have special hostility toward 'cop-killers' but that aspect of the case would follow [defendant] to whatever community in which venue ultimately resides." Odle v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d at 942. Not surprisingly, this is why courts have routinely held that the killing of a police officer is not a fact by itself that justifies a change of venue. People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900.

The defense does cite the case of <u>People v. Gladden</u> (1966) 385 U.S. 363, 365, for the proposition that bailiffs are significant figures in a trial. However, the case is not on point. In <u>Gladden</u>, the United States Supreme Court held that statements of a bailiff to certain jurors that the defendant was a wicked fellow, that he was guilty, and that if there was anything wrong in finding defendant guilty the Supreme Court would correct it, violated the Sixth Amendment of the Federal

Constitution. The mere presence of the bailiff to the jury was not the issue.

On the other hand, in People v. Mendes (1950) 35 Cal.2d 537, the California Supreme Court held that the defendant was not entitled to a change of venue from Colusa County on the ground that he could not secure a fair and impartial trial in the county where the trial was held because he was a foreign national charged with murdering a Colusa County deputized sheriff in a small community; where the jury was selected without undue difficulty; where the trial did not take place until approximately three months after the homicide; and the newspaper accounts did not appear to be different from the usual reporting of any homicide of the sort involved.

Although it was not specifically mentioned in the <u>Mendes</u> decision, it can be reasonably inferred that Colusa County Sheriff's Deputies served as bailiffs in the county courthouse, just as deputy sheriffs do in every other county of California.

Ultimately, there is not a single discoverable case that supports a change of venue based on the defense's theory.

Moreover, the sequestered voir dire process will provide the defense with an opportunity to question prospective jurors on this topic. Should the defense be successful in demonstrating some persistent and prevailing prejudice or bias in the minds of prospective jurors as a result of Yolo County deputy sheriffs guarding the courtroom, the defense can then renew its motion for change of venue. Odle v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 932.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion for a change of venue should now be denied.

Dated: April 29, 2010

Respectfully submitted,

JEEP REISIG DISTRICT ATTORNEY

SUPERIOR COURT NO. 08-3355 PROOF OF SERVICE

I, WENDY WILCOX, declare that I am a resident of the County of Yolo; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within entitled action; my business address is 301 Second Street, Woodland, California 95695.

On April 30, 2010, I served the within PEOPLE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE on counsel for defendant in this action, by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope and deposited the same in the United States mail at Woodland, California, addressed to the counsel of record in this action, as follows:

THOMAS PURTELL
ATTORNEY AT LAW
430 3RD STREET
WOODLAND, CA 95695

HAYES GABLE
ATTORNEY AT LAW
428 J ST., STE. 354
SACRAMENTO, CA 95814

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on April 30, 2010, at Woodland, California

WENDY WILCOX